Remedies for Foreign Citizens Subjected to Outsourced Pollution:  A Case Study of American Big Oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon by Azad, Ava
Florida A & M University Law Review
Volume 9
Number 2 Empowering Environmental Justice
Communities Locally and Globally--Fourth Annual
Environmental Law and Justice Symposium Issue
Article 3
Spring 2014
Remedies for Foreign Citizens Subjected to
Outsourced Pollution: A Case Study of American
Big Oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon
Ava Azad
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, International
Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida A & M
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ava Azad, Remedies for Foreign Citizens Subjected to Outsourced Pollution: A Case Study of American Big Oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 9
Fla. A&M U. L. Rev. (2014).
Available at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol9/iss2/3
Remedies for Foreign Citizens Subjected to Outsourced Pollution: A Case
Study of American Big Oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon
Cover Page Footnote
I would like to thank Professor Uma Outka for her guidance and support with this article and so much more.
Thanks also to Professor Randall Abate for his encouragement and to the staff of the Florida A&M University
Law Review for their constructive edits.
This article is available in Florida A & M University Law Review: http://commons.law.famu.edu/famulawreview/vol9/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam105.txt unknown Seq: 1  8-APR-15 11:55
REMEDIES FOR FOREIGN CITIZENS
SUBJECTED TO OUTSOURCED POLLUTION:
A CASE STUDY OF AMERICAN BIG OIL
IN THE ECUADORIAN AMAZON
Ava AzadA
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 R
I. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 R
A. Pollution Outsourcing and How it Benefits
Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 R
B. The Story of Texaco in the Ecuadorian Amazon . . . . . . . 282 R
C. Hazards Resulting from the Actions of MNCs . . . . . . . . . 286 R
1. Damage to Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 R
2. Environmental Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 R
II. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 R
A. Legal Logic for U.S. Companies Outsourcing Oil
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 R
B. Why the Law is Necessary to Prevent Environmental
Injustice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 R
C. U.S. Domestic Laws that May Provide Remedies to
Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 R
D. Ecuadorian Domestic Laws that May Provide
Remedies to Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 R
E. International Environmental Injustice and Domestic
Environmental Laws in Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 R
F. International Legal Recourse for Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 R
G. A Need for a Combination of the Above Laws to
Provide Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 R
INTRODUCTION
The term “globalization” generally carries a positive connota-
tion, invoking images of progress and international unity. “Technology”
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similarly enjoys a reputation of enabling human advancement and im-
proving sustenance, shelter, education, and overall quality of life. Both
promote the development of the other and their success has become
intertwined. Development of the oil industry is one newsworthy exam-
ple of the coming together of technology and globalization as nations
rush to discover, extract, and refine oil wherever possible and sell the
fuel to their own citizens or export it to other nations. Oil is also an
example of dangers generally not associated with technology and
globalization. The hazards of oil spills and waste for human and envi-
ronmental health are highly publicized and difficult to doubt.1 As the
oil industry has become globalized, so have the dangers to which it
leads. The focus of this paper is one such danger: the disproportionate
impact the exploitation of land for oil production by U.S. companies
has had on the indigenous people of Ecuador.
Oil exploration in the Amazon has become a booming global in-
dustry in recent decades. While the indigenous tribes of the region
have resisted the destruction of their land, they have been effectively
powerless.2 The disproportionate impact the oil business has had on
indigenous peoples, who lead nomadic lifestyles and are ill-equipped to
successfully participate in judicial proceedings, creates environmental
justice concerns.3 The attempt to remedy harm thus caused is a compli-
cated endeavor as it may involve the domestic laws of multiple
countries as well as international laws, as was the case in the Texaco-
Ecuador conflict addressed in this article.
1. E.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Gulf Oil Spill is Public Health Risk, Environmental
Scientists Warn, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2010, 4:29 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/may/28/bp-gulf-oil-spill-pollution; Bryan Walsh, Worst-Case Scenario:
Fighting the Gulf Oil Spill, TIME (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
0,8599,1986102,00.html; Ed Markey, One Year After the BP Oil Spill, Dangers Remain,
GRIST (Apr. 20, 2011), http://grist.org/oil/2011-04-20-one-year-after-the-bp-oil-spill-drilling-
is-no-safer/.
2. E.g., Steven Nelson, Ecuador’s Amazon Rainforest May Be Auctioned to Chinese Oil
Companies, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/
2013/03/28/ecuadors-amazon-rainforest-may-be-auctioned-to-chinese-oil-companies; Lauren
Johnson, Ecuador’s Indigenous Leaders Oppose New Oil Exploration’s Plan in Amazon
Region, EARTH ISLAND J. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/
elist/eListRead/ecuadors_indigenous_leaders_oppose_new_oil_exploration/; Kelly Hearn,
Oil Exploration in Amazon Threatens “Unseen” Tribes, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Mar. 21,
2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/03/080321-unseen-tribes.html.
3. “Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”
Environmental Justice, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ (last updated
July 24, 2014) [hereinafter Environmental Justice].
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This paper focuses on the relationship between United States
oil companies and Latin American countries for four main reasons.
First, the United States is a worthy point of reference in a discussion
involving countries with pollution-outsourcing corporations. It is a
world power, a nation with relatively progressive environmental laws,
and one of only a few nations in which the world’s major oil companies
originated.4 Given its geographic proximity to Latin America and infa-
mous oil exploration conducted in the region in recent decades,5 the
relationship between the two regions is highly relevant to the issue of
outsourcing polluting oil activities. Second, the global significance of
the Amazon as an ecological, biodiversity powerhouse makes it an ideal
candidate for consideration as a victim of globalization. “The Amazon
is the largest and oldest block of tropical rainforest on earth—over 60%
of our planet’s richest ecosystem.”6 The Amazon is extraordinary in
size—spanning nine South American countries, and in ecological prow-
ess—as the most biologically diverse region in the world. This places it
high on the priority list of regions that require environmental atten-
tion. Third, the nature and size of the forest and degree of oil
exploration that takes place there explain the effects on “some of the
last remaining indigenous cultures,” making this an environmental
justice issue.7 Finally, many areas of the Amazon are being exploited
for oil extraction, resulting in the implication of multiple countries.
The result is that the laws of multiple countries govern one of the larg-
est environmental landmarks of the planet. This requires a
comprehensive analysis of pertinent domestic and international laws
to discover the alternatives most effective in combatting the inevitable
environmental and social harms caused by the outsourcing of
pollution.
Such an analysis demonstrates that domestic laws and interna-
tional agreements are independently insufficient to provide adequate
redress for plaintiffs. Domestic laws should prohibit multinational cor-
4. E.g., Rob Wile, The 15 Biggest Oil Companies In The World, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 25,
2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/platts-worlds-biggest-oil-companies-2012-10?op=1.
See also, Corey Flintoff, Where Does America Get Oil? You May Be Surprised, NPR (Apr. 12,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/11/150444802/where-does-america-get-oil-you-may-be-
surprised (“America is one of the world’s largest oil producers . . . .”).
5. E.g., Bryan Walsh, Drilling for Oil Way, Way Offshore, TIME (Aug. 18, 2008), http://
www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1833379,00.html; Jonathan Watts, Petition to
halt oil exploration in Ecuadorian Amazon gets 1m signatures, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 6,
2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/06/petition-oil-ecuadorean-amazon-signa
tures.
6. J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & NIKKI D. THANOS, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: GLOBALIZATION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 132 (2003).
7. Id. at 142.
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porations (MNCs) from transporting their polluting activities abroad
or provide high environmental standards to which they hold MNCs
even when conducting operations abroad. Additionally, international
laws must be available to supplement enforcement when domestic laws
or their administration are lacking.
Part I of this paper first describes the benefits U.S. companies
derive from the outsourcing of pollution. Part I also details the Texaco-
Ecuador controversy and describes the harmful results of exporting
pollution. Part II revisits the benefits that outsourcing pollution brings
to outsourcing MNCs and explains why the law is necessary in manag-
ing environmental justice. Next, Part II discusses examples of domestic
laws in the U.S. and in Ecuador that may provide remedies for foreign
plaintiffs negatively affected by MNCs. The section then briefly dis-
cusses examples of outsourcing pollution in other parts of the world to
allow for a more in-depth comparative analysis. Finally, Part II dis-
cusses several international resources on which plaintiffs may rely.
This section concludes by proposing potential avenues for recovery, ex-
ploring possible combinations of domestic and international laws, and
determining which are likely to be most effective.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Pollution Outsourcing and How it Benefits Companies
Many people are familiar with the concept of outsourcing jobs,
which U.S. companies do to cut costs and increase profit by exploiting
low-cost labor abroad. Similarly, there are economic advantages for
American companies to conduct environmentally risky activities
abroad. Not only does the ability to produce oil globally increase the
number of locations from which a company can extract and profit from
oil, but performing these operations in countries with more lenient or
unenforced environmental laws limits the liability to which a business
is exposed compared to when the business is subject to U.S. environ-
mental laws.8
Of the countries in the Northern Hemisphere that account for
the exploitation of natural resources south of the equator, the United
8. See infra Part I.A.; see also Francis O. Adeola, Cross-National Environmental
Injustice and Human Rights Issues: A Review of Evidence in the Developing World, 43 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 686, 691 (2000) (listing “[t]he absence of national environmental policy in
many developing countries, lack of rigorous environmental laws and sanctions against
polluters, and desperation to accept pollution for economic gains in many poor countries” as
reasons for outsourcing pollution).
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States is the largest consumer.9 Outsourcing activities with a high pol-
lution-causing risk, like oil extraction and production, means
outsourcing the pollution and environmental injustice that result from
those activities.10 Hence, the parties benefiting and profiting from en-
vironmentally hazardous industrial activities “are insulated by
distance from direct sources of toxins.”11 Internal colonialism aids in
MNCs polluting in foreign nations because those countries themselves
are divided between dominant groups and weaker groups that are eas-
ily overpowered.12
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency and
state environmental agencies conduct inspections to monitor compli-
ance with federal and state environmental laws, which prevents oil
companies from escaping enforcement of those laws.13 If a company is
in violation of environmental laws, the agency with jurisdiction will
employ one of its authorized administrative powers to penalize the vio-
lating entity. For example, in 1999 EPA found 54% of oil refineries in
the U.S. in “significant non-compliance” with the Clean Air Act, 22% in
significant non-compliance with the Clean Water Act, and 32% in vio-
lation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.14 The
enforcement power granted to government agencies coupled with their
follow-through in ensuring compliance with the laws results in rela-
tively powerful environmental protection in the United States as
compared to Latin American countries.15 Unfortunately, the very
9. Id. at 694 (citing LYNTON K. CALDWELL, BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: SCIENCE, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTAND POLICY CHOICE (1990); ALLAN SCHNAIBERG & KENNETH A.
GOULD, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY: THE ENDURING CONFLICT (1994)).
10. Adeola, supra note 8, at 691 (“The condition of environmental injustice is directly
related to the global stratification system in which the economically and politically powerful
states are able to shift or impose the environmental burden on weaker states.
Underdeveloped societies are relatively powerless and disadvantaged due to their weak,
subordinate position in the world system.”).
11. Id. at 688; see also Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and
Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas, 32 INT’L ORG. 79, 80
(1978) (“The benefits of foreign investment are ‘poorly’ (or ‘unfairly’ or ‘unequally’)
distributed between the multinational and the host, or the country pays ‘too high’ a price for
what it gets . . . .”).
12. Adeola, supra note 8, at 693.
13. Compliance Monitoring, Inspections and Evaluations, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa
.gov/compliance/monitoring/inspections/ (last updated June 13, 2012). The authority for
these environmental agencies’ oversight is derived from various environmental statutes.
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (“the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency . . .
shall administer this chapter.”).
14. Dara O’ Rourke & Sarah Connolly, Just Oil? The Distribution of Environmental
and Social Impacts of Oil Production and Consumption, 28 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RES. 587, 603
(2003).
15. See infra Parts III.A. & III.D.
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strength of such environmental laws in industrialized countries leads
to violations of human rights and the right of indigenous groups to a
healthy environment in less-industrialized nations.16
B. The Story of Texaco in the Ecuadorian Amazon
In recent years, one case of outsourced pollution by an Ameri-
can MNC has gained considerable attention. Various scholarly17 and
media18 sources, including a documentary entitled Crude,19 have re-
counted the story of Texaco’s oil development in the Ecuadorian
Amazon primarily from the perspectives of the plaintiffs and their law-
yers. Non-profit organizations and environmental groups condemn the
oil company’s operations in the Amazon, exposing its alleged endanger-
ment of the ecosystem and native indigenous groups,20 while Chevron
presents its side of the story in a website dedicated to the contro-
16. Adeola, supra note 8, at 701.
17. E.g., Peggy R. Kalas, The Implications of Jota v. Texaco and the Accountability of
Transnational Corporations, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 47 (2000); Judith Kimerling, The
Environmental Audit of Texaco’s Amazon Oil Fields: Environmental Justice or Business as
Usual?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 199 (1994); Jennifer K. Rankin, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest:
Can a U.S. Court Find Liability for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S. Corporation?
An Analysis of Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1995); Victoria C.
Arthaud, Note, Environmental Destruction in the Amazon: Can U.S. Courts Provide a
Forum for the Claims of Indigenous Peoples?, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 195 (1994);
Jennifer E. Brady, Note, The Huaorani Tribe of Ecuador: A Study in Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 291 (1997);  Cortelyou Kenney, Comment,
Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857 (2009); Jonathan L. Mannina, Note, The Human Rights
Implications of Economic Development: A Case Study of the Huaorani People of Ecuador, 5
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 117 (1992).
18. E.g., Karen Hinton, Chevron in Ecuador: U.S. Oil Company Spies on Latin
American Country to Escape Multi-Billion Court Judgment, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14,
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/karen-hinton/chevron-in-ecuador-us-oil-company-
spies-on-latin-american-country_b_2861425.html; Patrick R. Keefe, Reversal of Fortune,
THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/
120109fa_fact_keefe?currentPage=1; Clifford Krauss, Consultant Recants in Chevron
Pollution Case in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/
business/research-recanted-in-oil-pollution-case-in-ecuador.html?_r=0; Chevron Loses in
Ecuador Amazon Case, INDUSTRY WKLY. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.industryweek.com/
environment/chevron-loses-ecuador-amazon-case; Supreme Court Won’t Consider Blocking
$18B Judgment Against Chevron, CNN (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/10/
world/americas/chevron-ecuador-lawsuit.
19. CRUDE (Entendre Films 2009).
20. E.g., Chevron’s Chernobyl in the Amazon, AMAZON WATCH, http://amazonwatch.org/
work/chevron; Chevron’s Toxic Legacy in Ecuador, RAINFOREST ACTION NETWORK, http://ran
.org/chevrons-toxic-legacy-ecuador; The True Story of Chevron’s Ecuador Disaster,
CHEVRONTOXICO: THE CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN ECUADOR, http://chevrontoxico.com/ (last
visited Feb. 10, 2015).
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versy21. Despite the somewhat stagnant and predictable arguments by
the parties, a long and convoluted factual and legal history precedes
the present conflict.
The “Oriente” is the portion of the Amazon that lies in Ecua-
dor.22 Eight indigenous tribes occupy the area.23 Texaco Petroleum,
now a Chevron subsidiary,24 discovered commercial oil in the Oriente
in 1967.25 It built a 312-mile oil pipeline from the Oriente to the Pacific
coast of Ecuador in 1972.26 Until 1989, Texaco used the pipeline to ship
what amounted to 1.4 billion barrels of oil.27 Throughout the 17 years
of use by Texaco, “[t]he pipeline ruptured twenty-seven times, spilling
what was estimated to be 16.8 million gallons of raw crude (more than
Exxon Valdez), most of it into the Oriente’s delicate web of rivers,
creeks, and lagoons.”28 Texaco finally withdrew from its operations in
Ecuador in 1992.29
The Oriente region holds 5% of the world’s plant species, yet
“almost no attempt was made to assess the environmental impact of oil
development . . . .”30 Ideally, the Ecuadorian government would assess
these impacts—for example, in accordance with statutory require-
21. Ecuador Lawsuit, CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2015).
22. Judith Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities: Environmental Protection
Law in Ecuador’s Amazon Oil Fields, 2 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 293, 295 (1995) [hereinafter
Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities]. Judith Kimerling is a professor at the City
University of New York Queens College. Professor Kimerling was an environmental
litigator for seven years and worked on the Love Canal litigation during her five years as
Assistant Attorney General for New York State. She moved to Ecuador in 1989 to research
oil development in the Amazon and its effects on indigenous peoples. She has since
published several articles and a book, Amazon Crude, on the topic. Kimerling also worked
briefly as an attorney for the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) after an
invitation to do so from Robert Kennedy and S. Jacob Scherr, the director of the
organization’s international program at the time. She was fired from that position for
refusing to accede to the NRDC’s decision to endorse Conoco’s plans to produce oil in the
Oriente. See David Bartecchi, A Profile of Judith Kimerling, the 2011 Albertson Medal
Winner, VILLAGE EARTH (July 15, 2011), http://villageearth.org/pages/village-earth-blog/a-
profile-of-judith-kimerling-the-2011-albertson-medal-winner; see also Joe Kane, Letter from
the Amazon: With Spears from All Sides, THE NEW YORKER 54, 60-62 (Sep. 27, 1993), http://
archives.newyorker.com/?i=1993-09-27#folio=054.
23. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 295.
24. Chevron Corporation, Texaco Petroleum, Ecuador and the Lawsuit against
Chevron, http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/texacopetroleumecuadorlawsuit.pdf.




29. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012).
30. Kane, supra note 22, at 60.
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ments like the National Environmental Policy Act of 196931 in the
U.S.—since profit motive may taint assessments prepared by oil
companies.
The people of the Oriente have “high rates of cancer, birth de-
fects, and other health problems linked to contaminants.”32 Along with
leaks from pipeline ruptures, oil waste containing toxic chemicals such
as arsenic, cyanide, lead, and mercury were disposed of in waste pits—
large holes dug into the ground next to oil wells—, which are washed
out by rainfall into other waters and land.33 The people affected by oil
activities and their repercussions were not consulted in the decision to
allow Texaco to drill for oil in the Oriente.34 Members of the Huaorani
tribe—the tribe most famous for suffering at the hands of Texaco’s op-
erations—cut down trees and attempted to block Texaco’s entrance,
but their efforts were short lived due to military coercion, which led to
the tribe signing an agreement with Texaco.35
Oriente residents first filed suit against Texaco in American
courts in Texas in 1993.36 After the dismissal of that case, the plaintiffs
brought suit in New York federal court.37 Texaco fought for years to
have the case dismissed and moved to Ecuadorian courts, which had
the potential of creating a more challenging case for plaintiffs due to
Texaco’s influence in Ecuador.38 The company eventually succeeded in
its efforts to convince the court that Ecuadorian courts (and Peruvian
courts for plaintiffs harmed in Peru) would be a more appropriate fo-
rum for the parties to conduct their case.39
In Ecuador, after more than a decade of litigation and Chev-
ron’s accusations of corruption and fraud in the judicial system,40 the
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2014).




36. Keefe, supra note 18, at 1; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (dismissing on grounds of comity and forum non conveniens); Sequihua v. Texaco,
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
37. Aguinda, 945 F. Supp. at 625, vacated, Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998).
38. Keefe, supra note 18, at 3 (“Ecuador’s judicial system was notoriously corrupt, and
its government relied on oil revenues for a third of its annual budget. ‘Texaco ran that
country for twenty years,’ Chris Jochnick, a law-school friend of Donzinger’s [the lead
American attorney on the case] who lived in Ecuador at the time and now works for Oxfam
America, told me.”).
39. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified,
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
40. CRUDE, supra note 19; Keefe, supra note 18, at 5-9.
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court found Chevron liable for over $8 million for environmental dam-
ages,41 an amount that eventually more than doubled because the
company refused to make a public apology to those who suffered from
the pollution.42 The conflict took another twist when Argentine courts
agreed to freeze Chevron’s assets in Argentina to enable the plaintiffs
to collect on the judgment (Chevron does not have assets in Ecuador
that plaintiffs could have pursued).43 The company challenged the au-
thority of the plaintiffs to utilize this method in a suit filed in New
York successfully seeking an injunction to bar plaintiffs from enforcing
the Ecuadorian judgment outside of Ecuador.44 The court of appeals
reversed that ruling,45 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.46
Dozens of other court and tribunal opinions have confronted various
components of this case.47 They will not all be addressed in this article.
As it stands in Ecuador, the rulings are in the plaintiffs’ favor;
however, with Chevron’s resistance, the 20-year battle is not yet re-
solved and the environmental degradation allegedly caused by Texaco
remains to be remediated. The most recent U.S. ruling on the case
came in March 2014 when Judge Kaplan of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held the results of the trial in Ecuador
unenforceable, agreeing with plaintiff Chevron that the Ecuadorian
41. Corte Provincial de Justicia Sucumbios [Sucumbios Provincial Court of Justice],
14/02/2011, Juicio No. 2003-0002 (Ecuador); Chevron ordered to pay $8 billion by Ecuador
court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/business/la-fi-
chevron-20110214; Ecuador appeals court rules against Chevron in oil case, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-16404268.
42. Ecuador appeals court rules against Chevron in oil case, supra note 41; Supreme
Court Won’t Consider Blocking $18B Judgment Against Chevron, supra note 18; Ecuador
Court Upholds $8.6 Billion Ruling Against Chevron, CNN (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.cnn
.com/2012/01/04/world/americas/ecuador-chevron-lawsuit/index.html. See Ecuador Court
Upholds $18BN Penalty Against Chevron, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jan/04/ecuador-upholds-chevron-fine (discussing an
Ecuadorean appeals court’s decision to uphold an $18 billion judgment against Chevron).
43. E.g., Argentine Court Rules Against Chevron in Ecuador Amazon Case,
GLOBALPOST (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130201/argentine-
court-rules-against-chevron-ecuador-amazon-case#1; Argentina ‘Freezes Chevron Assets’
Over Ecuador Damage, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-20246295.
44. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
45. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 232.
46. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
47. E.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011) (addressing
plaintiffs’ appeal of the lower court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motions to stay arbitration); In re
Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting Chevron’s motion to require
Donziger to respond to oil company’s subpoena, and denying Republic of Ecuador’s motion to
intervene in the matter); In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming lower
court’s order requiring Ecuadorian plaintiffs to disclose documents Chevron sought through
discovery).
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\9-2\fam105.txt unknown Seq: 10  8-APR-15 11:55
286 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 9:2:277
court proceedings were tainted by fraud and corruption.48 This ruling,
unless reversed, will certainly affect U.S. courts’ future decisions on
enforcing the foreign decision, and may influence other nations’ courts
as they are faced with demands to honor the Ecuadorian judgment.49
The saga continues with the appeal of Judge Kaplan’s decision to the
Second Circuit by some of the now-defendants.50
C. Hazards Resulting from the Actions of MNCs
1. Damage to Natural Resources
Oil production can lead to various forms of environmental deg-
radation. Clearing land to make way for oil exploration can cause
deforestation and erosion.51 The need for transportation by air and
ground, as evidenced by the Oriente controversy, requires landing strip
and road construction that necessarily destroy natural habitats.52 The
distance between oil production and consumption necessitates trans-
portation across long distances, inevitably resulting in oil spills.53
Media coverage exposes large oil spills and the environmental catastro-
phes they cause; however, “smaller but cumulatively significant spills
from shipping, pipelines, and leaks often go undocumented.”54
Drilling for oil requires a great deal of water, which, when dis-
charged, “result[s] in chemical contamination of land and water from
petroleum waste, drilling fluids, and by-products of drilling such as
water, drill cuttings, and mud.”55 Contaminated water, referred to as
“produced water,” that results from extraction contains heavy metals,
volatile aromatic hydrocarbons including benzene, toluene, and xylene,
48. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
49. Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/federal-judge-rules-for-chevron-in-
ecuadorean-pollution-case.html?_r=0.
50. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo (2d Cir. filed July 1,
2014) (No. 14-0826-cv), available at http://www.cnsenvironmentallaw.com/2014/07/08/
LAPsbrief.pdf; Corrected Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo (2d
Cir. filed July 16, 2014) (No. 14-826(L)), available at http://guptabeck.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/05/CA2-brief-corrections-RC4.pdf.
51. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 594; SANTIAGO BORASIN ET AL., OIL: A LIFE
CYCLE ANALYSIS OF ITS HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 6 (Paul R. Epstein and Jesse
Selber eds., Mar. 2002), available at http://chge.med.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/
oilfullreport.pdf.
52. BORASIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 9.
53. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 598.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 594.
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and other toxic compounds.56 Drilling and extraction of oil can lead to
chronic environmental degradation, physical fouling of water and soil,
habitat disruption, and livestock destruction.57 As an example of the
effects of American oil operations in the States, “[t]he oil and gas in-
dustry in the United States alone creates more solid and liquid waste
than all other categories of municipal, agricultural, mining, and indus-
trial wastes combined.”58
Although there was much argument regarding the environmen-
tal damages caused in Ecuador by Texaco, ultimately the company’s
contention in that case was legal, not factual.59 Texaco claimed that it
had remediated the pollution it had caused and for which it was legally
responsible given its share—37%—of oil development in the Oriente,
and was not liable for clean-up of any remaining pollution.60 Thus, it is
important for attorneys and scholars of remediation suits to recall that
pollution is not illegal per se, and that an MNC’s defenses may not be
limited because it polluted by scientific standards when it is not legally
accountable for that pollution.
2. Environmental Justice
Causing environmental damage abroad is an obvious conse-
quence of outsourcing pollution-causing operations. Environmental
injustice61 resulting from the location of that pollution and the people
it affects is less obvious. In the United States, the government must
provide environmental justice for all citizens as required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.62
However, as evidenced by the results of oil development in the Ama-
zon, globalization means environmental justice considerations should
not be domestically limited.63
Environmental injustice is arguably a violation of basic human
rights.64 What is especially disheartening about environmental justice
56. BORASIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 10.
57. Id. at 6.
58. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 594.
59. Keefe, supra note 18, at 6.
60. Id.
61. See Environmental Justice, supra note 3.
62. THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE].
63. See, e.g.,RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH
DIMENSION (2004); Luz Claudio, Standing on Principle: The Global Push for Environmental
Justice, 115 ENVIRON HEALTH PERSPECT. 10 (2007).
64. Adeola, supra note 8, at 686.
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cases such as that in the Oriente is that the public health and ecologi-
cal costs resulting from the activity “typically far outweigh the short-
term economic gains.”65 This is not surprising, considering the high
costs of litigation and the reality that such cases can continue for as
long as 20 years if not longer, as with the Oriente case. In an article
discussing the global effects of oil production written at a time when
the Bush administration was pushing for increased oil exploration and
production within and outside the United States, the authors stated,
“the actual distribution of costs and benefits of increased oil production
among countries, communities, and individuals is almost completely
absent from public discourse.”66 Although environmental justice has
gained momentum in recent years as an area of concern in the environ-
mental movement, it is far from reaching the forefront of decision-
making factors considered by businesses and governments.
Many nations have shown disregard for environmental justice
when faced with opportunities to develop and profit from natural re-
sources.67 As the Huaorani’s struggle to force their way into the
discussion of Texaco’s oil exploration and the case of the Urarina in
Peru68 demonstrate, minority groups are often purposely excluded
from planning and negotiations that will directly affect their well-be-
ing in the long run.69 Especially when a nation faces economic
difficulties and its government desperately seeks a source of revenue,
minority groups with little physical or political power can be ignored
for the sake of the nation.
It is difficult to quantify the harm to indigenous groups because
there is no comprehensive set of data on, for example, effects of oil re-
leases on indigenous people.70 This makes it difficult to point to specific
numbers that show the disproportionate impact on these minority
groups. Unfortunately, it is not surprising that there is little informa-
tion available on this point because globally, little value is expressed
for the survival of indigenous groups, especially as compared to indus-
65. Id. at 695.
66. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 588.
67. See Adeola, supra note 8, at 687 (stating “[t]here are some governments, especially
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, that have adopted a policy of systematic
genocide against minority groups in order to appropriate their lands and natural resources,”
specifically referencing indigenous people of Irian Jaya, Indonesia, the assassination of
Wilson Pinheiro and Francisco “Chico” Mendes in the Amazon, and the execution of
Nigerian tribal members).
68. See infra Part II.E.
69. See Adeola, supra note 8, at 688 (“Both environmental injustice and environmental
racism are promoted through systematic exclusion of minority groups in vital
environmental policies and decisions.”).
70. O’Rourke & Connollly, supra note 14, at 602.
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trial advancement and development. Given indigenous peoples’
disempowered position, minority status, and lack of the resources nec-
essary to prevail in a lawsuit in most countries—as hunter-gatherers
isolated from non-indigenous groups—they are often voiceless at the
hands of those manipulating their land and risking their survival.71
With this understanding, those who are in a position to create a voice
for indigenous and other minority groups in environmental discussions
must play a more active role in protecting those groups and concerning
those with power with the consequences of laws, both domestic and
international.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Logic for U.S. Companies Outsourcing Oil Production
To understand how to better structure domestic and interna-
tional environmental laws to prevent international violations of
environmental justice, it is useful to consider domestic environmental
laws and to determine why they may encourage a company to conduct
its business in a foreign country. The oil industry, like many industries
that involve risky operations that are likely to result in toxic waste, is
highly regulated in the United States. As one example of this
regulation,
[t]he Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
198672 requires that manufacturing facilities above a certain size
provide information about toxic chemical releases and offsite waste
transfers to the national Toxics Release Inventory (“TRI”). The oil
refining sector, but not exploration or extraction, is required to re-
port to the TRI.73
At least 15 other federal statutes and programs further regulate
the oil industry.74 This plethora of regulations prevents the oil indus-
71. See generally Kane, supra note 22 (telling the story of the indigenous Huaorani
tribe in Ecuador who were absent in practice, yet present in name in the fight against U.S.
oil production on their land); see also infra Part II.E. (discussing the Ogoni people of
Nigeria).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11004-1049 (1986).
73. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 603.
74. This includes the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (43 U.S.C. § 1701-87),
the Federal Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act (30 U.S.C. § 181-287), the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1331-56), the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 4321-70), the Oil Pollution Act (33 U.S.C. § 2701-62), the Clean Air Act’s National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 C.F.R. § 61-63) and National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (40 C.F.R. § 50), the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (33 U.S.C. § 1342) and Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure
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try from managing operations in a way that would result in the
destruction that it has in the Amazon or, at the very least, would result
in civil or criminal penalties.75 Not only does this signify that a foreign
forum would provide an escape for oil companies, making oil operations
less burdensome to perform, but may also result in less money spent on
court costs and fines for violating regulations. With this in mind, we
consider what the law’s role should be in counteracting environmental
injustice that may occur as a result of outsourcing oil operations.
B. Why the Law is Necessary to Prevent Environmental Injustice
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States entered a
period of staunch environmentalism. After the Industrial Revolution,
numerous wars, and rapidly advancing technology, people realized
that action was required to protect the remaining natural resources
and prevent further degradation of the environment. In recent de-
cades, the environmental justice movement has become a key
component of the environmental movement, with domestic and inter-
national implications. The reasons why law is necessary in the fight for
environmental justice are the reasons why law is necessary and exists
for most other societally elected rights and wrongs—the people deem a
certain liberty significant enough to deserve protection and/or a certain
wrongdoing reprehensible enough to deserve punishment. We gener-
ally regard the right to live in an environment that is not
contaminated—or in the least not contaminated to the point of causing
public and environmental health issues—as one that deserves protec-
tion. Support for this contention comes in the form of the
environmental laws and regulations that exist in the United States
Requirements (33 U.S.C. § 1321), and the Safe Drinking Water Act’s Underground Injection
Control program (40 C.F.R. § 144). O’ Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 609. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. § 6901-92) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C. § 9601-75) apply as
well. Id. Fuel is regulated under the Oxygenated Fuels Program (Press Release, EPA, New
Oxygenated Fuels Program (Oct. 30, 1992), available at http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/new-
oxygenated-fuels-program (announcing a program created under the Clean Air Act)), the
Highway Diesel Fuel Program (Heavy-Duty Highway Diesel Program, EPA.GOV, http://www.
epa.gov/otaq/highway-diesel/index.htm (last updated Aug. 8, 2012)), the Reformulated Fuels
Program (RFG Regulations and Standards, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/
gasolinefuels/rfg/regulations.htm (last updated Feb. 6, 2015), and the Leaded Gasoline
Removal Program. Id. Further, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulates worker safety for those in the oil industry. About OSHA, OSHA.GOV, http://www.
osha.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
75. See supra Part II.B.; Kane, supra note 22, at 79 (“In my mind, and in the minds of
many others, there is no question that the behavior of American oil companies in the
Amazon would invite prosecution if they acted that way at home.”).
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and worldwide. If we esteem this right and esteem equality, as we ex-
pressly do, it results that all people should share in this right equally.
When politically weak minority groups are the target of environmental
injustice, it presents a problem that must be addressed legally. Specifi-
cally, international law is necessary to combat environmental injustice
because “indigenous peoples are often shut out of the national political
systems that govern them, in practice if not by law . . . .”76
Furthermore, we cannot expect individuals and businesses,
whose motives are often not limited to public well-being and justice, to
self-govern; therefore, governments must establish laws to govern
them. In fact, outsourcing pollution by oil companies is a classic, even
exaggerated example of a negative externality: the company reaps the
financial benefits of oil production while evading liability from the en-
vironmental penalties to which it likely would be subject in the United
States and transferring the cost of pollution to the residents of the for-
eign nation. Enhancing domestic and international laws to hold MNCs
more accountable for their actions abroad would internalize the result-
ing pollution costs. In addition, it would serve to protect the global
commons,77 the protection of which would otherwise be ignored as it
more easily can be on a global scale where the polluters are even fur-
ther away from their contamination.
The cases discussed in this paper present a sample of the envi-
ronmental injustice that indigenous groups suffer globally. One source
states, “[i]n the western Amazon alone, at least 50 indigenous groups,
many of which are the world’s last isolated indigenous peoples, live
within oil and gas concessions that are under exploration or preproduc-
tion.”78 The well-being of the environment is arguably more crucial to
the well-being and survival of indigenous groups than groups with non-
indigenous lifestyles. Indigenous peoples depend highly on their imme-
diate surroundings for food, water, shelter, medicine, and even cultural
identity.79
76. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 308.
77. Referring to the concept of “tragedy of the commons,” which presents the scenario
of a group of people exploiting and benefitting from a resource without an individual
incentive to minimize or mitigate harm caused until the resource is depleted. Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
78. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 596.
79. See id. (“ ‘[T]erritorial integrity and control are necessary for the cultural
reproduction and ultimately the survival of Amazonian indigenous populations whose way
of life and well being are closely tied to a thriving rainforest[.]’ ”); Rights, Responsibilities,
and Realities, supra note 22, at 299 (“In the Amazon, oil development has created poverty
among indigenous peoples, by destroying natural resources that they use for nutritional,
medicinal, domestic, and religious purposes, and by endangering food and water supplies.”).
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Another function of law that confirms the need for legal protec-
tion against environmental injustice is that of giving a voice to those
who would otherwise be without it. The groups who need protection
against environmental injustice are the groups that do not have the
resources to defend themselves legally by, for example, suing in a tort
action. As an example, the Organization of the Huaorani Nation of the
Ecuadorian Amazon seemingly has “no office, no phone, and no
money.”80 Organizations such as these are not well-equipped to tackle
a lawsuit in a system that is set up for those with access to more mod-
ern methods of living. For a corporation like Chevron, financing
reputable lawyers with abundant resources is an expense built into the
business; however, for individuals harmed as a result of that com-
pany’s actions, the need to fund a legal battle is not a way of existence.
The dichotomy between wealthy defendant-corporations and impover-
ished plaintiff-minorities was evident in the crusade for financial
support led by the plaintiffs’ attorney, Steven Donziger.81 These disad-
vantages that minorities affected by pollution face necessitates laws to
provide for their protection.
C. U.S. Domestic Laws that May Provide Remedies to Plaintiffs
For foreign plaintiffs seeking recourse in U.S. courts for envi-
ronmental justice violations, the pertinent statute under which to sue
is the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA; sometimes referred to as the Alien
Tort Statute, or ATS).82 The ATCA, enacted in 1789,83 grants district
courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”84 For a tort to be actionable under the ATCA, it must
be well-established in international law.85 The act does not, however,
have to be that of a state actor, but may be an act by a private individ-
ual.86 Plaintiffs filing suit against corporations under the ATCA have
not been successful in obtaining remedies. In fact, “[t]o date, . . . no
80. Kane, supra note 22, at 56.
81. Keefe, supra note 18, at 4.
82. 13 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
83. E.g., The Alien Tort Claims Act Overview, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/
alientort.html; GARY C. HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 1 (2003).
84. 13 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
85. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (“We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in
the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of
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contested corporate [Alien Tort Statute] case has resulted in a jury ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiffs.”87 Many suits brought in U.S. courts for
foreign torts have been dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens
and comity.88
Another factor that comes into play in cases involving corpora-
tions as parties is the question of identifying the appropriate entity to
sue. Plaintiffs must identify the individuals responsible for causing the
harm and trace them to the corresponding business entity—a difficult
hunt given the complexity of corporate law and the relationships be-
tween corporations. This could be a difficult task particularly because
creating a corporation limits the liability of those behind the scenes—
e.g., shareholders are not personally liable for liabilities of the corpora-
tion and parent corporations are not liable for liabilities of their
subsidiaries89—so plaintiffs may be confused and restricted by who to
list as defendants. However, certain exceptions allow plaintiffs to ar-
gue for holding parent companies liable for the actions of foreign
subsidiaries.90 Plaintiffs can defeat the limits on corporate liability by
piercing the corporate veil91 or pursuing the parent company directly
a state or only as private individuals.”); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir.
1996).
87. The Alien Tort Statute, THE CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), http://
www.cja.org/article.php?id=435.
88. THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 772. See Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (granting defendant oil company’s renewed motion
to dismiss case on forum non conveniens where defendant agreed to suit in Ecuador and
Peru); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of
tort suit of 700 Peruvian citizens against copper company under forum non conveniens); In
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part,
modified in part, 809 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 871 (1987) (dismissing
case of gas leak at chemical plant in India under forum non conveniens stating that Indian
courts would be a more effective forum for the case); Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp.
132 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dismissing action joining claims of citizens from 12 foreign countries
for injuries obtained from nematocide exposure stating that the 12 countries provided
adequate alternative forums); Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(dismissing case brought by Ecuadorian citizens for soil, air, and water contamination); but
see Jota, 157 F.3d 153 (reversing district court decision to dismiss under forum non
conveniens and international comity where plaintiffs could not seek relief in Ecuadorian
courts because of defendant’s failure to agree to suit abroad).
89. David S. Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the United
States and the European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive, 19 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (1996).
90. WALDEMAR BRAUL & PAUL WILSON, PARENT CORPORATION LIABILITY FOR FOREIGN




91. “Piercing the corporate veil” is a “[l]egal theory used to ignore the separate entity of
the corporation and hold individual shareholders individually liable.” Clarence
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for tort liability.92 These considerations are important for foreign
plaintiffs seeking damages for environmental degradation caused by
U.S. corporations; however, they will not be discussed further, as cor-
porate law is not within the purview of this paper.
For plaintiffs who have succeeded in lawsuits abroad, the next
step may be to invoke the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (UFCMJRA) to enforce that judgment in the U.S. The
Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the UFCMJRA in 1962,
with a revised version promulgated in 2005.93  The Act provides for
Featherstone, Tag You’re It!!! Finding the Liable Business Entity, Envtl. Prot. Agency 8th
National Training Conference on PRP Search Enhancement and Financial Analysis (June
5-8, 2012). Accord, e.g., In re Friedlander Capital Mgmt. Corp., 411 B.R. 434, 440-41 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2009) (“Under . . . veil piercing, a party attempts to pierce the corporate veil in
order to hold the corporate shareholders liable for the actions of the corporation.”); Amore ex
rel. Estates of Amore v. Accor, 529 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Courts reserve
piercing the corporate veil for the rare circumstances in which an individual or corporation
abuses the corporate form or exerts undue influence over a corporate entity to accomplish
an improper or unlawful purpose. . . . Traditional notions of piercing the corporate veil
involve ‘shareholders and officers [who] may be held personally liable for their corporations’
obligations . . . if they . . . met the requirements of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ under
traditional common law principles.”) (internal citations omitted). This principle is not
limited to shareholder liability for a corporation’s actions, but extends to parent
corporations’ liability for actions of subsidiaries. See, e.g., Andrew N. Davis, Stephen J.
Humes & Catherine K. Lin, When Is The Parent Company Liable? A Lesson In Corporations,
Subsidiaries and Environmental Problems, 12 BUS. LAW TODAY 29, 29-30 (2002) (“The
interaction of common corporate functions and activities with certain environmental laws
can potentially impose future environmental obligations on a parent corporation with
respect to its subsidiary’s operations. . . . [I]n many instances, a corporate parent’s risk of
incurring environmental liability under U.S. law because of participation in or control of its
subsidiaries’ environmental operations, or because the parent made corporate resources
available to its subsidiaries, the use of such resources would be extended to pay for an
environmental cleanup at the subsidiary level. Just as likely, corporate parents can face
potential risk of exposure for the activities of their corporate subsidiaries located outside of
the United States.”).
92. See BRAUL & WILSON, supra note 90, at 1. (citing cases from the United States,
Canada, and Europe including Re Oil Spill By The Amoco Cadiz Off The Coast of France On
March 16, 1978, MDL Docket No. 376 ND Ill. 1984, American Maritime Cases, 2123-2199
(holding Standard Oil liable for oil spill of its subsidiary Amoco Transport, a Liberian
corporation); Beazer & Atl. v. Envtl. Appeal Bd., Vancouver Registry Doc. L001638
(B.C.S.C. 2000) (ordering parent corporation to remedy contamination caused by its defunct
subsidiary); United Can. Malt Ltd. v. Outboard Marine Corp. of Can., 34 C.E.L.R. 116 (N.S.
2000) (holding parent U.S. corporation could be held liable for leachate contamination by its
Canadian subsidiary by piercing the corporate veil because parent corporation “controlled”
the subsidiary); U.S. v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (holding that parent corporation
can be held liable under CERCLA for its subsidiary’s actions); Lubbe v. Cape Plc, 4 All E.R.
268 (English House of Lords 2000) (permitting over 3,000 South Africans to bring suit in
England against English parent corporation for subsidiary asbestos mine’s tortious
activity)).
93. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Foreign-Cou
ntry+Money+Judgments+Recognition+Act [hereinafter FCMJRA Summary].
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enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. state courts, except in certain
situations of mandatory or discretionary non-recognition.94
New York is one of the 32 states that have adopted this uniform
law.95 In Chevron’s most recent attempt to evade liability, the corpora-
tion successfully urged the New York federal district court to declare
the Ecuadorian judgment unenforceable under the Act’s exceptions,
which include foreign judgments obtained using fraud or from a cor-
rupt court.96 This lawsuit took place even though plaintiffs have not
yet attempted to enforce the judgment in New York, demonstrating the
Act’s potential as a preemptive force.
States that have not adopted the UFCMJRA rely on common
law to address questions of foreign judgment recognition.97 The gen-
eral common law principles on foreign judgments strongly resemble
those of the UFCMJRA, and are reflected in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law.98 Some states consider reciprocity (i.e.,
whether the foreign nation would recognize a similar U.S. judgment) in
deciding whether to honor a foreign judgment.99 Federal courts apply
either federal principles (in cases of federal question subject matter ju-
risdiction) or the law of the corresponding state (under the Erie
doctrine in cases of diversity subject matter jurisdiction).100
With these options in mind, the discussion will now turn to the
ways in which a plaintiff might seek a judgment in Ecuador.
D. Ecuadorian Domestic Laws that May Provide
Remedies to Plaintiffs
At the time Texaco entered into negotiations with Ecuador, Ec-
uador did not have the Constitution it has today, which is replete with
protections for the natural world and those who inhabit it.101 As in the
94. Id.; UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 (2005),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20judgments%20
recognition/ufmjra%20final%20act.pdf.
95. See FCMJRA Summary, supra note 93; N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney 1970).
96. See supra note 48.
97. RONALD A. BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 6
(2012), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/brandenforce.pdf/$file/branden
force.pdf (examining laws governing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
state and federal courts). Special thanks to Professor John Head for his insights into the
topic of foreign judgment recognition laws.
98. Id. at 6-7.
99. Id. at 11-12.
100. Id. at 4-5.
101. See Kane, supra note 22 and accompanying text. Texaco discovered oil in Ecuador
in 1967. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 300. Ecuador adopted the
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United States, the Ecuadorian Constitution is the supreme law of the
land.102 Unlike in the U.S., this “supreme law” has not been strictly
administered.103 Article 424 first declares the Constitution to prevail
over all other laws; next it joins the Constitution with “international
human rights treaties ratified by the State and which recognize more
favorable rights than those contained in the Constitution” as prevail-
ing over all other laws and actions of public power.104 In continuing
with hierarchical establishment, Article 425 plainly orders the sources
of authority: “the Constitution; international treaties and agreements;
organic laws; ordinary laws; regional norms and district ordi-
nances . . . .”105 The supremacy of the Constitution is not surprising or
unique; however, the positioning of international treaties and agree-
ments in the hierarchy is noteworthy. It signifies that where
Constitutional language or enforcement is lacking, international
agreements ratified by the country are the most authoritative laws.
Although the political forces within the country may be incapable of or
unwilling to compel compliance with national laws, foreign nations can
reference Ecuador’s own constitution in combination with its adoption
of international treaties to enforce compliance at the international
level.
The judiciary is tasked with administering justice through, in-
ter alia, administrative, economic, and financial autonomy, and public
decisions.106 Moreover, access to judicial administration is gratui-
constitution that was in force during oil exploration and conflict in 1978. Id. Ecuador’s
environmental laws when Texaco entered were generally sparse and did not serve to
regulate the MNC’s activities. See Keefe, supra note 18, at 2 (“Texaco’s practices did not
directly violate Ecuadorian law; in fact, the country had no meaningful environmental
regulations at the time.”).
102. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 424 [All references herein were translated by the
author].
103. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 298. See also, Mary E.
Whittemore, Comment, The Problem of Enforcing Nature’s Rights Under Ecuador’s
Constitution: Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite, 20 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 659 (2011) (discussing why the environmental amendments to the Ecuadorian
Constitution will likely not be enforced); Watts, supra note 5 (“The petition . . . calls on
Correa [Ecuador’s president] to stop oil exploration in the Amazon and uphold the
Ecuadorian constitution, which is the only one in the world to recognise the rights of nature
. . . . Ecuador is seeking $27 billion . . . in compensation from Texaco for damages the US
company[ ] . . . did in the Amazon, yet the government continues to promote exploration by
Petroamazonas, Repsol and other oil firms.”).
104. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 424.
105. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 425.
106. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 168.
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tous.107 However, parties to suits are often obligated to pay
administrative costs or bribes to court officials.108
The Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes its citizens’ right to a
healthy environment.109 The Constitution declares “environmental
preservation, ecosystem conservation, biodiversity and integrity of the
nation’s genetic patrimony, prevention of environmental harm and re-
cuperation of degraded natural areas” of public interest.110 The charter
continues to assert that “the State will promote . . . the use of environ-
mentally clean technology and alternative energy that is non-
contaminating and of low impact” in both the private and public sec-
tors.111 Further, “energy sovereignty will not advance to the detriment
of alimentary sovereignty, nor will it affect the right to water.”112 Arti-
cle 15 also strictly prohibits “the development, production, possession,
commercialization, import, transport, storage and use of . . . highly
toxic persistent organic contaminants . . . harmful to human health or
that threaten alimentary sovereignty or ecosystems . . . as with the
introduction of . . . toxic waste into national territory.”113
The Ecuadorian Constitution even goes so far as to proclaim
rights held by nature.114 In fact, Ecuador is the first nation to declare
such rights in its Constitution regarding nature as an entity possess-
ing legal rights separate from people’s property rights in nature.115
The newly added Article 71 reads,
Nature or Mother Earth, where life is reproduced and realized, has
the right to integral respect for its existence and the maintenance
and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions, and evolu-
tionary processes. Every person, community, village or nationality
can demand from public authorities compliance with the rights of
nature. To apply or interpret these rights, the following principles
established in the Constitution shall be observed.116
107. Id.
108. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 305. See also Roger
Parloff, Key Chevron Witness Describes Alleged Corruption in Ecuadorian Courts, FORTUNE
(Oct. 28, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/10/28/key-chevron-witness-describes-
alleged-corruption-in-ecuadorian-courts/ (recounting the testimony of an Ecuadorian judge
stating that he bribed and was bribed and that most judges in Ecuador are bribed).
109. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 14.
110. Id.
111. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 15.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, tı́t. II, cap. 7.
115. Andrew Revkin, Ecuador Constitution Grants Rights to Nature, N.Y. TIMES (Sep.
29, 2008), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/ecuador-constitution-grants-
nature-rights/.
116. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 71.
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The proceeding sections assert that the State will incentivize its
people “to protect nature, and will promote respect for all the elements
that form an ecosystem,”117 and that nature has a right to restoration
independent from the State’s and individuals’ obligation to indemnify
individuals who depend on affected natural systems.118 Article 72
states, “in cases of serious or permanent environmental impact, includ-
ing those occasioned by the exploitation of non-renewable natural
resources, the State will establish the most effective mechanisms to
achieve restoration, and will adopt adequate measures to eliminate or
mitigate injurious environmental consequences.”119
Article 73 of the Constitution accounts for biodiversity protec-
tion by obliging the government to take “precautionary and restrictive
measures with activities that may lead to the extinction of a species,
destruction of ecosystems or permanent alteration of natural cycles.”120
Finally, the last article of the Constitution’s seventh chapter grants
people the right to benefit from the environment and natural riches
that will provide them a good life.121 “Environmental services will not
be susceptible to appropriation; their production, benefits, uses and ap-
plication will be regulated by the State.”122
These amendments to the Constitution were added in 2008, de-
cades after Texaco initiated its dealings with Ecuador.123 As for
providing recourse for the Huaorani and similarly situated people,
these provisions cannot provide a remedy without applying the Consti-
tution retroactively. An unrelated case decided in 2011 was the first
successful attempt to apply the new provisions to protect the environ-
ment.124 This case provides hope that the new constitution will result
in stronger environmental protection and repair in the future, with the
help of determined plaintiffs willing to push for enforcement of the su-
preme law.
117. Id.
118. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 72.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 73.
121. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 74.
122. Id.
123. Revkin, supra note 115.
124. Corte Provincial de Justicia de Loja [Loja Provincial Court of Justice], 30/3/2011,
“Richard Fredrick Wheeler y Eleanor Geer Huddle c. Paulo Carrion / acción de protección,”
Juicio No. 11121-2011-0010 (Ecuador), available at http://mariomelo.files.wordpress.com/
2011/04/proteccion-derechosnatura-loja-11.pdf (applying the constitutionally-established
rights of the environment to find that the Vilcabamba River is entitled to respect and
regeneration, suspending a road construction project that had led to the dumping of waste
into the river, and requiring defendants to publically apologize for initiating construction
without an environmental license).
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Less hopeful is the fact that nothing in the Ecuadorian Consti-
tution specifically provides for the protection of indigenous peoples.
The closest it comes to such a notion is the protection provided for cul-
ture, which is limited to the national identity, celebration of and
appreciation for the arts, artistic expression, and diversity gener-
ally.125 One reporter who spent time in Ecuador investigating the
Oriente controversy stated that,
Manuel Navarro, who was the Petroecuador executive charged with
overseeing the relationship between the Indians and the Company,
told me that under Ecuadorian law foreign oil companies are pro-
hibited from negotiating directly with the Indian groups, because
such contact jeopardizes the Indians. (It is just this law, in fact,
behind which such companies as Arco and Texaco hide when they’re
accused of ignoring the Indians on whose land they’re drilling for
oil.).126
This law, in theory, is beneficial for indigenous groups because it pro-
tects them from companies coercing tribe members to sign agreements
they neither understand nor can read.127
The Ecuadorian Constitution does provide for equality and pro-
tection of all citizens.128 However, the prevalence of racism toward
indigenous groups and concentration of power in a limited few means
lack of protection for indigenous peoples.129 The tendency is to develop
indigenous lands and “promote assimilation into the dominant Ecuado-
rian culture.”130 The Amazonian indigenous groups are therefore
subject to two types of marginalization: one by the foreign oil company
developing their land, and one by their own government permitting the
development.131
One portion of the Constitution does mention cultural diversity
in relation to environmental principles: Title VII, Chapter 2, Biodivers-
125. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 377-80.
126. Kane, supra note 22, at 77.
127. Id. at 76 (describing the signing of an agreement drafted by U.S. oil company
Maxus by Huaorani tribe representatives who opposed the road construction the agreement
claimed they supported, and who were likely all illiterate).
128. E.g., CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 11 § 2 (stating that all people are equal and
possess the same rights, duties, and opportunities).
129. See, e.g., JAMES D. BOWEN, A SUBTLE KIND OF RACISM: ELITES, DEMOCRACY, AND
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS IN MODERN ECUADOR (2008) (discussing inequality and racism
against indigenous peoples in Ecuador and throughout Latin America); JEANNETTE
SÁNCHEZ, INEQUALITY, ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL DISORDER: THE ECUADORIAN CASE (2005),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/1149208-1147789
289867/IIIWB_Conference_Inequality_Ethnicity_and_Social_Disorder.pdf (discussing
racism toward indigenous peoples and their treatment as “second-rate citizens”).
130. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 297.
131. Id. at 297.
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ity and natural resources.132 The first section of this chapter states,
“the State will guarantee a sustainable model of development, environ-
mentally balanced and respectful of the cultural diversity, which
conserves biodiversity and the ability of ecosystems to regenerate nat-
urally, and assures the satisfaction of the needs of present and future
generations.”133 One of the segments of the Constitution most signifi-
cant to the Huaorani is a later part of this section, which asserts, “The
State will guarantee the active and permanent participation of affected
persons, communities, towns and nationalities, in the planning, execu-
tion and control of all activities that generate environmental
impacts.”134 The law prohibiting foreign companies from negotiating
with indigenous peoples135 most certainly conflicts with this provision
of the Constitution by removing indigenous tribes from pivotal busi-
ness discussions.
This section of the Constitution also has provisions that mirror
the U.S.’s CERCLA by imposing liability for environmental harm, in-
cluding sanctions and a duty to integrally restore the ecosystem and
indemnify affected persons and communities.136 It also includes provi-
sions that mirror the U.S.’s RCRA by making “all actors of the
processes of production, distribution, commercialization, and use of
goods or services” assume the responsibility to act in an environmen-
tally cautious manner and mitigate resulting damages.137 Legal
actions to impose liability for environmental harm are “non-prescrip-
tive,” meaning they cannot be limited by statutes of limitation.138
Chapter 2 of Title VII contains numerous articles following
those discussed above, but they all hum the same tune. Article after
article, biodiversity and natural resources (e.g., land, water) are
praised for their undeniable import and the State is obliged with tak-
ing measures in nearly all ways conceivable to ensure the well-being of
the environment.139
Simultaneously, the Ecuadorian government is responsible for
determining the fate of the nation’s oil. In Ecuador, subsurface miner-
als belong to the government;140 thus, when foreign companies want to
132. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, tı́t. VII, cap. 2.
133. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 395.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
136. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 396.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 397-415.
140. Kane, supra note 22, at 56; Keefe, supra note 18, at 2.
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gain access and rights to oil, they must obtain approval from the gov-
ernment. If the environmental standards for the government are lower
in countries like Ecuador than they are in the U.S., and the foreign
government is incentivized to do business with oil companies, those
companies will be well-received in those nations. The principal motiva-
tion of Latin American governments when inviting foreign companies
to ransack their Amazonia is to create a source of revenue for the coun-
try because of the massive amounts of international debt these nations
have incurred over time.141 In the Ecuadorian Amazon, for example,
where “[o]il development . . . is virtually unregulated,” the govern-
ment’s international debt is high, and nearly half of its income is
derived from oil, the government invites foreign companies like Texaco
that will create revenue.142 This economic dependence is the reason
why the nation’s environmental regulations, first established in 1990,
are so poorly enforced.143 The government’s welcome in combination
with the lack of regulation for oil development makes such situations
prime opportunities for companies seeking to maximize profit through
an environmentally risky activity.
This can be contrasted with the process such a company must
undergo to obtain comparable rights to oil in the United States. Oil is a
leasable mineral in the U.S. and unless an entity owns the property on
which it is conducting its operations, it must obtain a lease from the
government to use federal land.144 Since granting such a lease would
be a “major federal action”145 that may significantly harm the human
environment, the granting agency must satisfy the standards of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires the agency
to consider the impact of its actions (e.g., actions it supports through
leasing) on the environment, and consider the possibility of alternative
actions meeting the purpose and need of the proposed action.146 The
public nature of this process also serves to educate the public on
141. TIMMONS, supra note 6, at 17-21.
142. Kane, supra note 22, at 56. See also Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra
note 22, at 299 (“petroleum provides roughly forty to fifty percent of Ecuador’s export
income and national budget, depending on the international price of oil.”); Keefe, supra note
18, at 2 (“The government of Ecuador had been aware of Texaco’s techniques from the start,
and for many years Texaco was in a consortium that included the national oil company.”).
143. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 612. See also Rights, Responsibilities, and
Realities, supra note 22, at 295 (“Although Ecuadorian law is theoretically replete with
environmental rights and responsibilities that protect biodiversity and the natural
resources that are vital to the health and well-being of local populations, the law has not
played an effective role in protecting environmental and human rights in the Amazon.”).
144. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 226 (2005).
145. 30 U.S.C. § 185(h) (2005).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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problems with and alternatives to federal (and state, under the state
counterparts to NEPA) actions affecting the environment. The NEPA
process is tedious and time-consuming, often taking several years to
overcome legal challenges to the sufficiency of the government’s analy-
sis, and would certainly serve to discourage a company from engaging
in such negotiations with the government.
The Ecuadorian legal system is highly corrupt due to courts’
manipulation by the executive and legislative branches, which compete
for power. Therefore, the judiciary does not serve as recourse for poten-
tial litigants unable or unwilling to try their hand at a corrupt system
that would require large bribes to reach a resolution.147 To emphasize
how problematic a biased judge may be, the Ecuadorian judicial system
does not provide for jury trials; thus, a case may rest on the discretion
of just one judge.148 Failure to administer justice properly may actually
incentivize foreign businesses, such as oil tycoons, to conduct opera-
tions abroad where, even if taken to court, they can prevail by out-
financing their case (i.e., through bribes) against weak opponents, like
indigenous groups.
Another critique is that many of Ecuador’s “constitutional pro-
visions [and statutes] have simply been copied from other
countries.”149 Further, Ecuador’s government is a constitutional de-
mocracy, but the “democratic institutions remain fragile and
underdeveloped, and a strong executive dominates the government,”
which is not traditionally held to the laws of the country.150 The judici-
ary has failed to properly administer the laws and compensate for the
deficiencies in other areas of government.151 The Constitution requires
147. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 301-06. See also supra note
48 and accompanying text (describing the ruling of a New York court that the Ecuadorian
judgment, held to be tainted by fraud and corruption, is unenforceable).
148. Keefe, supra note 18, at 3.
149. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 300, 300 n. 21 (claiming, as
examples to support this statement, that the people’s constitutional right to live in an
environment without contamination was taken from the Chilean constitution, and that the
Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination was copied from
Mexican law. Kimerling also characterizes Ecuadorian statutory law as segmented and
contradictory.). Accord LAURA CHINCHILLA & DAVID SCOTT, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN ECUADOR 69 (1993) (“Ecuadorian law is characterized by extensive copying of foreign
codes with little reference to the social and economic reality of the country in which the code
is being applied, uncoordinated participation of diverse institutional actors in the
implementation of legislation, and even sometimes, contradictions between norms.”).
150. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 295-96. See also CHINCILLA
& SCOTT, supra note 149, at 76 (“The Ecuadorian Judiciary is unquestionably the weakest
branch of government. It has been subservient to the executive and legislative branches
throughout much of its history . . . .”).
151. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 296.
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the judiciary to be “internally and externally independent,” a require-
ment the violation of which should result in administrative, civil, and
penal repercussions in accordance with the law.152 These supposed
safeguards of judicial autonomy fail in practice because of their subor-
dination to the nation’s social and political tendencies.153
E. International Environmental Injustice and Domestic
Environmental Laws in Other Nations
Latin America is not the only region in the world where indige-
nous groups are threatened. One example from Africa is the Ogoni
tribe of Nigeria. When members of this tribe took matters upon them-
selves and protested the military government, environmental injustice,
and human rights violations in their country against the Ogoni people,
sixteen tribe members were jailed and nine, including the leader of the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, were executed after a
trial in front of a military tribunal.154 This case illustrates that if the
government is authoritarian and corrupt, internal protests and cries
for change within a nation can only do so much good and may even
result in greater harm.
Another case of Amazonian indigenous peoples falling victim to
oil exploration is the entrance of a British oil company into the lands of
the Urarina of Peru.155 As in the Oriente case, the MNC obtained the
signature of one tribe member, who did not represent the majority, as
though it were an indication of the group’s consent.156 This type of ma-
nipulation by an MNC of illiterate indigenous tribe members
undermines one of the few reliable resources some groups have to fight
large corporations: solidarity among tribe members.
Yet another setback to ensuring global environmental well-be-
ing and justice is the lack of environmental laws in many nations.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Nige-
ria has no pollution control policy; therefore, “the laws that do exist are
152. CONSTITUCIÓN DEL ECUADOR, art. 168.
153. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 300 (“[T]he Constitution
formally guarantees judicial independence. . . . [I]n practice, however, these and other
constitutional guarantees have been largely ineffective due to the enormous gap between
constitutional ideals and Ecuador’s social values and power structures.”).  According to
Kimerling, “In the Amazon, the oil industry is essentially self-policing in environmental
matters.” Id. at 296. See also Chincilla & Scott, supra note 149, at 70-72 (describing the
ways in which social trends have influenced the poor administration of justice by the
Ecuadorian judiciary).
154. Adeola, supra note 8, at 700-01.
155. BORASIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 18.
156. Id.
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not enforced.”157 The EIA also reports that Saudi Arabia had no envi-
ronmental protection agency until 2001.158
With these obstacles facing so many indigenous tribes interna-
tionally, it is instructive to consider legal remedies these groups may
have at the international level.
F. International Legal Recourse for Plaintiffs
Although environmental justice has become of international
concern as well as domestic, there is no single international forum es-
tablished to resolve environmental justice claims as, for example, the
Environmental Protection Agency does in the United States.159 Cer-
tain organizations and subcommittees exist, however, whose missions
overlap with discovering and impeding environmental injustice. The
United Nations Human Rights Committee is one example. Another is
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization
of American States. Often times the most effective resource in forcing
parties to act in accordance with environmental justice principles is
the pressure or shame brought on that party by international
players.160
One recourse Chevron sought in the Oriente case was interna-
tional arbitration overseen by a tribunal of international
arbitrators.161 The tribunal considered whether the proceedings in Ec-
uador were in accordance with international law, and published a
procedural order and interim measures suspending enforcement of the
Ecuador judgment pending the final results of the arbitration.162 The
interim measures the tribunal imposed were taken pursuant to Article
26 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)163 Arbitration Rules.164 This demonstrates one way in
157. O’Rourke & Connolly, supra note 14, at 612.
158. Id.
159. GRACER ET AL., supra note 88, at 765.
160. Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 22, at 312 (“The effectiveness of
human rights litigation in remedying violations generally depends on engaging reluctant
governments, and persuading or shaming them to voluntarily remedy violations of law.”).
161. E.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim
Award on Interim Measures (2012), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0173.pdf.
162. Id. at 13-16.
163. UNCITRAL is the “core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of
international trade law . . . UNCITRAL’s business is the modernization and harmonization
of rules on international business.” About UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral
.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html.
164. Chevron, PCA Case No. 2009-23 at 10, 16.
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which a party to a case crossing country lines can bind the hands of the
other party by causing delay with the support of an international
entity.
In addition to the further-reaching treaties described above,
certain limited international treaties exist that may provide tools for
fighting these injustices. If an incident similar to that between the U.S.
and Ecuador were to occur between the United States and Canada or
Mexico, one source of relief for aggrieved plaintiffs could be the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),165
which is enforceable against parties of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).166 This agreement allows NAFTA nations to
force other NAFTA nations to enforce their environmental laws.167 The
drawback is that the environmental laws that apply are only the do-
mestic laws of one country, and the NAAEC is only available to the
three NAFTA member-nations. This may be helpful in situations
where, for example, U.S. companies on the border with Mexico are pol-
luting air that affects both countries, but not where one country is
polluting in another and subject to the host country’s environmental
laws.
Under the NAAEC, non-profits and citizens of one of the
NAFTA nations can submit a complaint alleging one of the other na-
tions has not acted in accordance with its environmental laws.168 The
secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
the agency that administers the NAAEC, then considers the complaint
and decides whether to move forward and whether the accused country
should respond to the allegation.169 If the facts of the record are con-
firmed by a two-thirds vote of the CEC council, the record is released to
the complainant and the public.170 Complaints from citizens often in-
volve a government’s failure to account for indigenous people’s
environmental needs, especially in Mexico and Canada.171
Although the NAAEC allows citizens to bring environmental
law violations to the international forum, even where a record is ap-
proved, no enforcement remedy exists under the agreement to ensure
165. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=
567 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
166. GRACER ET AL., supra note 88, at 766.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 767.
169. Id. at 766-67.
170. Id. at 767-68.
171. GRACER ET AL., supra note 88, at 768-69.
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that the culprit nation amends its errors.172 Citizens and non-govern-
mental organizations can only hope that the government will take
steps to correct the violations, such as engaging in a formal consulta-
tion with another NAFTA party under Article 22 of the NAAEC or in
formal dispute resolution under Part V of the NAAEC.173 As is the case
with international agreements generally, the NAAEC is beneficial in
theory because it brings environmental issues to the discussion; how-
ever, its effectiveness is limited due to a lack of enforcement.
G. A Need for a Combination of the Above Laws to Provide Recourse
The preceding analysis of domestic and international laws leads
to several conclusions. One avenue for improvement is making indus-
try activities that involve high risks of pollution not legally exportable.
This would hold every corporation to the standards of the country in
which it is incorporated and unable to escape these laws to conduct its
activities in a nation with lower environmental standards. However,
with the rapid rate of globalization we encounter today, a proposition
to disincentivize international expansion would be met with great
protest.
Another potential solution is for domestic environmental laws
to apply to MNCs when they conduct business in foreign nations to
prevent them from thwarting the severity of their home nations’ laws
simply by polluting elsewhere.174 The difficulty with this method is en-
forcement. For example, to implement this change in the laws, an
already overextended EPA may have to hire inspectors to monitor com-
pliance at an international level. Even under such a system, there
would not be enough governmental employees to provide as much over-
sight as would likely be required for controlling companies all around
the world.
This method could also be implemented by requiring companies
that go abroad to hire an outside third party to inspect for compliance
and report to EPA. However, this may lead to issues of dishonesty and
fraud. One final way to implement this method is to instruct the envi-
ronmental enforcement body in the foreign nation to monitor the U.S.
company as it would its own, but apply U.S. environmental laws in-
stead of the host nation’s laws. If a company is in violation, the foreign
government agent could report the wrongdoing to EPA for enforce-
ment. Teaching a new set of environmental laws and regulations to a
172. Id. at 768.
173. Id.
174. E.g., Adeola, supra note 8, at 703.
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foreign citizen, however, would be a cumbersome task, and may result
in improper application of U.S. laws by an inexperienced agent. Fur-
ther, the same problem exists in this situation as exists where the host
nation applies its own laws: a host government that is foremost con-
cerned with revenue production will not be incentivized to report an
MNC’s environmental law violations even if they are of the laws of the
MNC’s home state.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the most prac-
tical domestic environmental laws to apply to MNCs are those of the
host state. This allows each nation’s environmental protection agency
to become an expert in its own laws without the overwhelming burden
of learning and applying the laws of other nations. Where this becomes
insufficient is when a nation is lacking either stringent environmental
laws or their enforcement. In situations where a home state has en-
acted a statute such as the ATCA, a plaintiff may avoid environmental
law claims altogether and seek redress for tort or other actions in the
home state. Otherwise, where application of domestic laws proves in-
adequate for effective protection, international agreements serve as
the remedy.
Thus, a plaintiff suffering at the hands of an invasive MNC
must first determine which laws and which forum would put her in the
strongest position. If the claims are environmental, only the laws of the
host country and international laws will apply. If the host country’s
environmental laws are weak or the judicial system corrupt, the plain-
tiff may prefer an international forum. For claims of human rights
violations, the claims should likely be international as many treaties
address human rights and such violations generally cause interna-
tional outrage. Alternatively, if a plaintiff decides the facts of her case
fall within the home state’s laws providing a cause of action for extra-
territorial activities, she may first pursue that route to avoid litigation
in the host state or litigation or arbitration under international agree-
ments, the enforcement of which is often an obstacle. While making the
decision of where and for what claims to file suit, a plaintiff will likely
realize that she is not limited to only one of these options. If the first
attempt is unsuccessful, she can pursue the next best recourse until all
possible paths to recovery have been exhausted.
CONCLUSION
The importance of protecting the environment and those who
inhabit it is now a globally recognized principle. There is much less of a
consensus, however, regarding how best to structure laws to provide
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for the most effective protection of environmental rights. Countries cre-
ate their own laws independently as well as joining other nations in
forming international agreements on the subject. Considering the
many intricacies involved in outsourcing pollution to a foreign country,
it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to ensure a respectable
outcome regarding the resulting environmental harm caused by MNCs
without combining domestic and international laws to meet the needs
of our ever-globalizing world. With both tiers of laws available, we are
better able to provide a voice to disproportionately affected minority
groups so they may defend their cultures, health, and the environ-
ments on which they so dearly rely.
